The prevailing perception of a terrorist is a young, impoverished, frustrated, uneducated Arab Muslim male motivated by a radical ideology, hatred of the West, religious fervor, psychosis, and ignorance. However, what has emerged in recent years as a result of demographic studies of terrorists is that there is no single, immutable "terrorist profile." The lessons to be learned from these findings are that the physical embodiment of the threat poses a more complex challenge to US national security infrastructure than was previously understood, and demography must be a key component of US national security strategy.
Highlighting several of the demographics factors experts have identified can be instructive in determining how the US should adapt to the changing physical threat.
For many years, there was an assumption that poverty breeds terrorism and that correcting the distribution of wealth would reduce terrorist activity. Studies have concluded that improving the economic conditions of developing countries and creating job opportunities can reduce the likelihood that impoverished people will become involved in terrorist activity. However, recent studies of terrorists paint a more complex picture: for example, some terrorists come from middle or upper classes and are employed.
Dr. Marc Sageman, former operations officer for the CIA and author of Understanding Terrorist Networks, collected data on 400 Al Qaeda terrorists, all of whom targeted the US. Three quarters of the terrorists came from the middle or upper classes ("the best and brightest of their societies" – some educated, some married, most with intact families and jobs, etc.). Also, a recent book by Princeton economics and public policy professor Alan Krueger titled What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism suggests that populations in nations with higher incomes and education levels, where higher rates of terrorist activity occur, are more likely to view terrorism as justifiable. If education, jobs, and a steady income are available, what other variables might explain why someone might become involved in terrorist activity?
The "halal theory of terrorism," developed by Dr. Sageman and known among counterterrorism officials as the "bunch of guys" (BOGs) or "group of guys" (GOGs) theory, is defined as a small, self-radicalized, loosely organized terrorist cells or networks. Based on data collected on 172 Al Qaeda members, Sageman concluded that "[t]he only significant finding was that future terrorists felt isolated, lonely, and emotionally alienated." (Most had no criminal records or history of mental disorders). Is the US national security community planning on how to make people feel less "lonely"?
Political, economic, and social oppressiveness are also cited as primary causes of terrorism. Desperation and frustration, caused and compounded by regime corruption, lack of opportunity, and alienation, breed violence, and the pattern is cyclical and often interminable. This, however, does not explain "homegrown terrorism" - terrorist attacks perpetrated against Western democracies by their own citizens. Two of the three men recently arrested in a plot to reportedly attack a US airbase in Germany were German. Five of the seven suspects arrested in a domestic terrorist plot against Chicago’s Sears Tower in 2006 were from the US. The four men who carried out the 2005 London bombings resided in the United Kingdom. (Three were born in England; one was born in Jamaica and raised in London.)
In 2006, former FBI Director Robert Mueller, speaking of an alleged terrorist plot to bomb several prominent buildings in Toronto and Ottawa and to kill the prime minister, said that the 17 suspects "were students and business people and members of the community. They were persons who, for whatever reason, came to view their home country as the enemy." The radicalization of homegrown terrorists, he said, "is fluid; it does not follow a set formula or timetable." (He also stated that "some may be lonely or dissatisfied with their role in society.")
The recruitment and deployment of female terrorists has also added an unexpected dimension to demographic studies of terrorists. Various terrorist organizations such as Hamas, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and more recently, Al Qaeda, have begun actively recruiting and using females. To date, there have been 10 documented female suicide bomber attacks in Iraq, according to a leading expert on the topic, Farhana Ali of Rand. (A 2005 Al Qaeda suicide bomber attack in Iraq was conducted by a 38-year-old female Belgian, a convert to Islam.) The most widely published analyses have examined the role of women as terrorist suicide bombers. Muslim female suicide bombers known as the "mujaidaat" have carried out attacks in Iraq, Israel, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and Jordan. The Chechen "Black Widows" rose to prominence in Moscow in 2002 when they threatened to blow up a Moscow theater.
"Youth bulges" in Muslim countries have been the subject of intense analyses with regard to how this trend contributes to the spread of terrorism. Demographers agree that there is cause for concern. An essay by the Council on Foreign Relations cites a report published by Population Action International: "between 1970 and 1999, 80 percent of civil conflicts occurred in countries where 60 percent of the population or more were under the age of thirty…. Today there are sixty-seven counties with youth bulges, of which sixty of them are experiencing social unrest and violence." In the Middle East, 60 percent of the population is below the age of twenty-five. Moreover, history suggests that the conditions created by "youth bulge" may have other indirect and unanticipated consequences for US national security and terrorism that should receive attention. For example, according to a 2003 article published in the Economist, "France experienced a ‘youth bulge’ in the 1780’s, which increased demand for scarce food supplies; that, in turn, drove up prices, hurt the business classes and helped to create conditions for its revolution in 1789".
Demographic trends, while useful in understanding the causes and conditions that underlie terrorism, are complicated by the lack of a common definition of "terrorism". This interferes with efforts to mine demographic data and it also skews statistics. For example, the State Department and the National Counterterrorism Center define terrorism as: "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." The FBI defines it as "the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." There are other definitions used by non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, and international intelligence organizations.
There is also debate over what constitutes "terrorism" ("terrorist" or "freedom fighter"): Is the Polish Jewish insurgent destruction of Nazi supply trains and the death of German crew considered terrorism? Is the Sunni "Honorable Resistance" that kills civilians justified on political grounds? Is the Sudanese government’s backing of an armed Arab militia to carry out attacks on non-Arab tribes justified on the grounds of nationalism?
In addition to highlighting the need for clearer language with regard to terrorism, demographics reinforce the need for a more complementary, integrative, and adaptive US national security strategy to address the many variables of terrorism. Demographics must be a key component of this strategy. They can guide how the US addresses the various conditions that cause and exacerbate terrorism, provide insights as to how to confront terrorists with differing motivations (political, ideological, feelings of isolation, etc.), and inform how and whether the US should intervene in conflicts that may incite terrorist activity.
Demographic data can also guide how and where the US allocates its financial, military, and diplomatic resources and other instruments of national power in the war on terrorism. For strategic, operational, and tactical US intelligence, law enforcement, and military operations, the demographics of terrorism can be applied to terrorist "red-teaming" and simulation exercises. And terrorists are also using demographic data, for fundraising via the Internet and to impact public opinion via telecommunications. Mining, analyzing, and applying this data can serve as a useful predictive US counterterrorism tool.
The data can also be used to educate the public and mitigate disinformation regarding the terrorist threat, by the international media in its coverage of security issues (public education, public perception, counterterrorism, and terrorist recruitment efforts) and by the US State Department in its public diplomacy and strategic communications initiatives.
Developing a US national security strategy that factors in demographics as a key component will enhance the larger understanding of the physical threat posed by terrorists and improve broader US counterterrorism efforts at home and abroad.
Lauren Bean is editor of the National Strategy Forum Review.
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